This post is meant to refer to a knol Ihave written in response to a recent question posed on the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) community website : “Will public deficit reduction encourage private sector growth, or undermine a needed stimulus to recovery & lead to Japan-style stagnation?” This lead me, in view of my work on BICs, to wonder whether the deficit is really the right metric to focus on and analyze the extent to which it could be misleading.
I argue that the government balance sheet, rather than its cash flow position -from which the deficit is computed - should really be what eyes are focused on. The focus on balance would have and should better focus minds on stimulating high returns investments for sustainable recovery and expansion, some of which I discuss.
BICs enter in the picture because using their methodological prescription would make reliable and practical the complex and almost canutian task of computing the values of the different items on the government balance sheet.
I am gratified that the debate INET moderating team has picked on some of my suggestions and highlighted them in the debate summary(http://ineteconomics.org/blog/inet-community-responds-deficit-debate) as: "As far as new, creative solutions to the debate, a few users, such as kongtcheu, have urged governments to invest in entrepreneurship and clean energy projects, suggesting that these investments will create jobs and growth in the future."" I meant to say more than that.
References
Kongtcheu, Phil. The Deficit Debate - BICs:Is the deficit the right metric to focus on ? And what prescriptions does this leads to? [Internet]. Version 45. Basis Instruments Contracts (BICs). 2010 Aug 25. Available from: http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/the-deficit-debate-bics/24v2kgtuvzk2v/30.
http://ineteconomics.org/blog/inet-community-responds-deficit-debate
Showing posts with label Paul Krugman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Paul Krugman. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Thursday, May 27, 2010
Easy Money, Hard Truths
I liked this piece in the times quite a lot. It is a useful refresher course on macroeconomics and articulate the deficit hawks thoughtful worries about ballooning deficits and debt. It argues fairly persuasively that the lack of apparent inflation in reported numbers might be a smoking mirror or at any rate unhealthy.
It is a fairly challenging counter argument to the "forget-about-the-deficit,-there-is-no- inflation,-expansionary-government-policies" Krugman regularly pushes in his pieces.
The weakness of this analysis in my view is that it is poorly prescriptive. Mindless belt tightening at all costs as one would would asphyxiate the economy making the current predicament even worse. Krugman pushes for expansion but in traditional sectors of the economy.
What I have failed to see in both analyses is the effort to help flow credit to start ups in the services industry who are likely to open up the new industries which are most likely to help the country grow out of its mounting liabilities. When I read about the paltry efforts to get money through the SBA, it is quite puzzling. Thomas Friedman regularly does a god job at drawing the need to focus efforts on high tech startups of the future, but again his prescription for helping flow money in a timely manner to this sector is neither refined nor well calibrated enough.
And this would get me to... BICs
References:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/opinion/27einhorn.html?hp=&pagewanted=all
It is a fairly challenging counter argument to the "forget-about-the-deficit,-there-is-no- inflation,-expansionary-government-policies" Krugman regularly pushes in his pieces.
The weakness of this analysis in my view is that it is poorly prescriptive. Mindless belt tightening at all costs as one would would asphyxiate the economy making the current predicament even worse. Krugman pushes for expansion but in traditional sectors of the economy.
What I have failed to see in both analyses is the effort to help flow credit to start ups in the services industry who are likely to open up the new industries which are most likely to help the country grow out of its mounting liabilities. When I read about the paltry efforts to get money through the SBA, it is quite puzzling. Thomas Friedman regularly does a god job at drawing the need to focus efforts on high tech startups of the future, but again his prescription for helping flow money in a timely manner to this sector is neither refined nor well calibrated enough.
And this would get me to... BICs
References:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/opinion/27einhorn.html?hp=&pagewanted=all
Saturday, April 3, 2010
On Financial Reform :Regulation Vs. Size of Banks, A false dichotomy?
The debated on financial reform as summarized by Krugman in his latest piece in the NYT seems to have boiled down to the Volker position of limiting the size of financial institutions so that they do not reach a too big to fail size or the position of Krugman of tight and generalized regulation of Banks and shadow banks.
It seems to me that both analysis miss the simple but central ingredient needed to secure the financial system while not impending economic growth and that is a centralized clearing of all trades. Centralized clearing by nature remove a lot of the incentives in the buildup of too big to fail financial entities, it brings a level of transparency that all times gives regulator a clear picture of the dangers in the positions taken by financial/ economic actors.
A simple example to illustrate the power of centralized counterparty on trades. When you go online to buy an item or at the to a store and you use a credit card, that transaction is facilitated and secured by the existence of a centralized counterparty who keeps track of your assets and liabilities and authorize the transaction only when you have enough credit. No party to the transaction takes credit risk on the other and the system is robust. If the same worked among financial trading institutions the same efficiency and security would be gained, eliminating much of the systemic risks that are the source of current concerns.
See:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/opinion/02krugman.html?src=me&ref=general
The Holistic Theorem
It seems to me that both analysis miss the simple but central ingredient needed to secure the financial system while not impending economic growth and that is a centralized clearing of all trades. Centralized clearing by nature remove a lot of the incentives in the buildup of too big to fail financial entities, it brings a level of transparency that all times gives regulator a clear picture of the dangers in the positions taken by financial/ economic actors.
A simple example to illustrate the power of centralized counterparty on trades. When you go online to buy an item or at the to a store and you use a credit card, that transaction is facilitated and secured by the existence of a centralized counterparty who keeps track of your assets and liabilities and authorize the transaction only when you have enough credit. No party to the transaction takes credit risk on the other and the system is robust. If the same worked among financial trading institutions the same efficiency and security would be gained, eliminating much of the systemic risks that are the source of current concerns.
See:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/opinion/02krugman.html?src=me&ref=general
The Holistic Theorem
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
The Stimulus Evidence One Year On
I read this piece by Robert Barro in the WSJ shrugging my head in distrust over macro-economists and their analysis. To understand what I mean, contrast this piece with this one by Krugman written in January http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/18/opinion/18krugman.html
The real moral of the story here is that there will always be a very reputable and leading economist to support whatever position one wants to take on a macro economic issue. Why is that? The answer lies in the number of assumptions one needs to make without much hedging backup to come to any prescription.
From the distance of BICs master obsessed with being able to hedge probabilistic assumptions, I was tinged by:
- the widespread assumption that multipliers used are fixed quantities,
- Wildly speculative sentences such as "...second, this multiplier provides a reasonable gauge (and likely an upper bound because of the strong wartime boost to labor supply due to patriotism) for the effects of nondefense government purchases.".
- I did not see any inflationary discount when adding up the numbers.
The real moral of the story here is that there will always be a very reputable and leading economist to support whatever position one wants to take on a macro economic issue. Why is that? The answer lies in the number of assumptions one needs to make without much hedging backup to come to any prescription.
From the distance of BICs master obsessed with being able to hedge probabilistic assumptions, I was tinged by:
- the widespread assumption that multipliers used are fixed quantities,
- Wildly speculative sentences such as "...second, this multiplier provides a reasonable gauge (and likely an upper bound because of the strong wartime boost to labor supply due to patriotism) for the effects of nondefense government purchases.".
- I did not see any inflationary discount when adding up the numbers.
Monday, September 7, 2009
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? - NYTimes.com
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? - NYTimes.com
This piece is well written and offers a plausible explanation within the framework of mainstream accepted knowledge. But it's explanations merely reflect what has emerged as conventional wisdom and the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of its author, namely strength in economic history understanding and relative weakness in mathematical fluency.
As a result the piece trashes mathematical skill and look to economic history in Keynesian analysis to seek prescriptions for the current predicament.
What Mr. Krugman may not be able to grasp is not that there are good maths and there are bad maths. The maths used in economic theory and neoclassical economic theory since the end of WWII is transposed from Physics and seems a priori impressive. But we seek to address economic issues. "It ain't Physics" . It is only suitable and built for a world with no constraints on resources, continuity of time and space, unrestricted trade i.e. no frictions, perfect rationality of operators, etc.
There have been recent attempts to correct those assumptions, but all withing the edifice of the traditional mathematical architecture.
Indeed behavioral economics and finance are descriptive theories and provide a well deserved criticism of rational agents theories, but these have not been translated in efficient prescriptive formulations.
BICs are built from the ground up to provide a more resilient framework for more effective formulations that reflect actual human economic reality and behavior. They provide the math to efficiently accommodate evolving economic realities
My biggest concern is with prescriptions that are derived from Mr. Krugman's analysis. They are backward looking and fail to integrate the economic transformations that have taken place since the 1930s, notably the advent of the Internet, the rise of the service and network economies, the relative decline of manufacturing as a source of economic wealth, globalization, the environment...
-------------
PS: The following section made me scratch my head:"The theoretical model that finance economists developed by assuming that every investor rationally balances risk against reward — the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM (pronounced cap-em) — is wonderfully elegant. And if you accept its premises it’s also extremely useful. CAPM not only tells you how to choose your portfolio — even more important from the financial industry’s point of view, it tells you how to put a price on financial derivatives, claims on claims."
Although the original vanilla call option was originally priced by Fischer Black using a CAPM based argument, derivatives pricing theory in all subsequent textbooks more the arbitrage arguments along Merton's Rational Pricing Theory. It is true that Merton makes a CAPM style argument to value derivatives in incomplete settings such as underlyings driven by jumps, but a robust and replicative pricing argument can still be made without reference to the CAPM and its outrageous assumptions, as I do with BICss.
OK, here let's just say the proposition on CAPM as the modern tool used to value derivatives is debatable. As far as I know, the CAPM is more commonly used in corporate finance for corporate valuation purposes where one uses the CAPM to obtain the required rate of return that is used to discount expected future earnings to deduce present value.
But what's really is a bit startling to me is the characterization of derivatives as "claims on claims"... Derivatives are contracts whose payout is is derived from(i.e. is a function of )the value of other observables(stocks, credit indices, temperature,...) at payout payment time(i.e. maturity).
This piece is well written and offers a plausible explanation within the framework of mainstream accepted knowledge. But it's explanations merely reflect what has emerged as conventional wisdom and the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of its author, namely strength in economic history understanding and relative weakness in mathematical fluency.
As a result the piece trashes mathematical skill and look to economic history in Keynesian analysis to seek prescriptions for the current predicament.
What Mr. Krugman may not be able to grasp is not that there are good maths and there are bad maths. The maths used in economic theory and neoclassical economic theory since the end of WWII is transposed from Physics and seems a priori impressive. But we seek to address economic issues. "It ain't Physics" . It is only suitable and built for a world with no constraints on resources, continuity of time and space, unrestricted trade i.e. no frictions, perfect rationality of operators, etc.
There have been recent attempts to correct those assumptions, but all withing the edifice of the traditional mathematical architecture.
Indeed behavioral economics and finance are descriptive theories and provide a well deserved criticism of rational agents theories, but these have not been translated in efficient prescriptive formulations.
BICs are built from the ground up to provide a more resilient framework for more effective formulations that reflect actual human economic reality and behavior. They provide the math to efficiently accommodate evolving economic realities
My biggest concern is with prescriptions that are derived from Mr. Krugman's analysis. They are backward looking and fail to integrate the economic transformations that have taken place since the 1930s, notably the advent of the Internet, the rise of the service and network economies, the relative decline of manufacturing as a source of economic wealth, globalization, the environment...
-------------
PS: The following section made me scratch my head:"The theoretical model that finance economists developed by assuming that every investor rationally balances risk against reward — the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM (pronounced cap-em) — is wonderfully elegant. And if you accept its premises it’s also extremely useful. CAPM not only tells you how to choose your portfolio — even more important from the financial industry’s point of view, it tells you how to put a price on financial derivatives, claims on claims."
Although the original vanilla call option was originally priced by Fischer Black using a CAPM based argument, derivatives pricing theory in all subsequent textbooks more the arbitrage arguments along Merton's Rational Pricing Theory. It is true that Merton makes a CAPM style argument to value derivatives in incomplete settings such as underlyings driven by jumps, but a robust and replicative pricing argument can still be made without reference to the CAPM and its outrageous assumptions, as I do with BICss.
OK, here let's just say the proposition on CAPM as the modern tool used to value derivatives is debatable. As far as I know, the CAPM is more commonly used in corporate finance for corporate valuation purposes where one uses the CAPM to obtain the required rate of return that is used to discount expected future earnings to deduce present value.
But what's really is a bit startling to me is the characterization of derivatives as "claims on claims"... Derivatives are contracts whose payout is is derived from(i.e. is a function of )the value of other observables(stocks, credit indices, temperature,...) at payout payment time(i.e. maturity).
Sunday, July 5, 2009
New Stimulus ? No Stimulus?
Bruce Bartlett, a former treasury dept economist has an article in the FT titled "We do not need a second stimulus plan"
He explains that because really stimulative programs that were part of the stimulus would only stimulate much later, there is no basis for declaring the stimulus plan passed earlier in the year was insufficient and that we need a new one.
Indeed Krugman has held a different view for a long time. So I just checked his blog and there is an entry on the article titled "Bruce Bartlett misstates the problem"
he points out the statement:
"The problem is that the Obama administration was much too optimistic about how quickly stimulus spending would affect the economy. Christina Romer, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Jared Bernstein, chief economist to vice president Joe Biden, forecast in January that the stimulus would reduce unemployment almost immediately."
and points that it is inaccurate.While this may be factually true, it seems to me it does little to invalidate the central argument Mr. Bartlett is actually making.
I wish there would be more Krugman substantiation of the statement: "The problem, instead, is that the hole the stimulus needs to fill is much bigger than predicted."
I would be very interested in finding data quantifying the scope of shovel ready projects with large multiplier effects.
As I have written elsewhere projects with network effects as described in my holistic theorem would have the biggest stimulative impact, possibly at the lowest cost.
These include
-network infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges, in particular near housing developments (These would help support prices of houses in those areas by making the developments more easily accessible to urban work areas)
- internet infrastructure development projects
-electrical/smart grid development projects
-Financial Services central clearing
The question to me is how many(number and budget) can be moved along, on what timeframe,
07/09/09 - Here's the WSJ survey of economists on the question:
He explains that because really stimulative programs that were part of the stimulus would only stimulate much later, there is no basis for declaring the stimulus plan passed earlier in the year was insufficient and that we need a new one.
Indeed Krugman has held a different view for a long time. So I just checked his blog and there is an entry on the article titled "Bruce Bartlett misstates the problem"
he points out the statement:
"The problem is that the Obama administration was much too optimistic about how quickly stimulus spending would affect the economy. Christina Romer, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Jared Bernstein, chief economist to vice president Joe Biden, forecast in January that the stimulus would reduce unemployment almost immediately."
and points that it is inaccurate.While this may be factually true, it seems to me it does little to invalidate the central argument Mr. Bartlett is actually making.
I wish there would be more Krugman substantiation of the statement: "The problem, instead, is that the hole the stimulus needs to fill is much bigger than predicted."
I would be very interested in finding data quantifying the scope of shovel ready projects with large multiplier effects.
As I have written elsewhere projects with network effects as described in my holistic theorem would have the biggest stimulative impact, possibly at the lowest cost.
These include
-network infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges, in particular near housing developments (These would help support prices of houses in those areas by making the developments more easily accessible to urban work areas)
- internet infrastructure development projects
-electrical/smart grid development projects
-Financial Services central clearing
The question to me is how many(number and budget) can be moved along, on what timeframe,
07/09/09 - Here's the WSJ survey of economists on the question:
Friday, March 6, 2009
Op-Ed Columnist - The Big Dither - NYTimes.com
Op-Ed Columnist - The Big Dither - NYTimes.com
This article shows how even the "best and the brightest" seem not to see that the best approach to address this issue is as I describe in my article with the government becoming a market maker on TARP's illiquid asset. Nationalization in my view is not the answer, nor is some of the establishment of some of the private/ public funds. This structures merely add transactions cost and may only tangentially address the core issue
This article shows how even the "best and the brightest" seem not to see that the best approach to address this issue is as I describe in my article with the government becoming a market maker on TARP's illiquid asset. Nationalization in my view is not the answer, nor is some of the establishment of some of the private/ public funds. This structures merely add transactions cost and may only tangentially address the core issue
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