Comment:
Such a waste!
This is a very costly way of dragging down long term rates. As I have noted on many earlier posts, it once more makes me thing how much most cost-efficiently the fed could control long term rates with interest rate BICs that replicate the whole interest rate curve
See earlier posts on the topic:
http://kongtcheu.blogspot.com/2009/03/fed-will-inject-1-trillion-more-into.html
http://kongtcheu.blogspot.com/2009/04/ftcom-comment-opinion-let-central-banks.html
http://kongtcheu.blogspot.com/2009/07/op-ed-contributor-great-preventer.html
News References:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703506904575592471354774194.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/business/economy/04fed.html?_r=1&ref=business
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/03/AR2010110305412.html
Sharing information about BICs and showing its superior power in addressing Economic, Financial, Mathematical & Current Issues through the dissemination of relevant material and occasional review of news and articles
Showing posts with label Economic Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economic Policy. Show all posts
Thursday, November 4, 2010
Friday, March 19, 2010
Greek Derivatives, Derivatives' Greeks, BICs and the Risk Management Illusions that lead to recent financial disasters
This Knol article points to a strange coincidence of words and circumstances surrounding the Greek debacle and the dangers associated with the use of Greeks in financial derivatives risk management...
Check it out!
http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/greek-derivatives-derivatives-greeks/24v2kgtuvzk2v/23#
Check it out!
http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/greek-derivatives-derivatives-greeks/24v2kgtuvzk2v/23#
Monday, September 7, 2009
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? - NYTimes.com
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? - NYTimes.com
This piece is well written and offers a plausible explanation within the framework of mainstream accepted knowledge. But it's explanations merely reflect what has emerged as conventional wisdom and the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of its author, namely strength in economic history understanding and relative weakness in mathematical fluency.
As a result the piece trashes mathematical skill and look to economic history in Keynesian analysis to seek prescriptions for the current predicament.
What Mr. Krugman may not be able to grasp is not that there are good maths and there are bad maths. The maths used in economic theory and neoclassical economic theory since the end of WWII is transposed from Physics and seems a priori impressive. But we seek to address economic issues. "It ain't Physics" . It is only suitable and built for a world with no constraints on resources, continuity of time and space, unrestricted trade i.e. no frictions, perfect rationality of operators, etc.
There have been recent attempts to correct those assumptions, but all withing the edifice of the traditional mathematical architecture.
Indeed behavioral economics and finance are descriptive theories and provide a well deserved criticism of rational agents theories, but these have not been translated in efficient prescriptive formulations.
BICs are built from the ground up to provide a more resilient framework for more effective formulations that reflect actual human economic reality and behavior. They provide the math to efficiently accommodate evolving economic realities
My biggest concern is with prescriptions that are derived from Mr. Krugman's analysis. They are backward looking and fail to integrate the economic transformations that have taken place since the 1930s, notably the advent of the Internet, the rise of the service and network economies, the relative decline of manufacturing as a source of economic wealth, globalization, the environment...
-------------
PS: The following section made me scratch my head:"The theoretical model that finance economists developed by assuming that every investor rationally balances risk against reward — the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM (pronounced cap-em) — is wonderfully elegant. And if you accept its premises it’s also extremely useful. CAPM not only tells you how to choose your portfolio — even more important from the financial industry’s point of view, it tells you how to put a price on financial derivatives, claims on claims."
Although the original vanilla call option was originally priced by Fischer Black using a CAPM based argument, derivatives pricing theory in all subsequent textbooks more the arbitrage arguments along Merton's Rational Pricing Theory. It is true that Merton makes a CAPM style argument to value derivatives in incomplete settings such as underlyings driven by jumps, but a robust and replicative pricing argument can still be made without reference to the CAPM and its outrageous assumptions, as I do with BICss.
OK, here let's just say the proposition on CAPM as the modern tool used to value derivatives is debatable. As far as I know, the CAPM is more commonly used in corporate finance for corporate valuation purposes where one uses the CAPM to obtain the required rate of return that is used to discount expected future earnings to deduce present value.
But what's really is a bit startling to me is the characterization of derivatives as "claims on claims"... Derivatives are contracts whose payout is is derived from(i.e. is a function of )the value of other observables(stocks, credit indices, temperature,...) at payout payment time(i.e. maturity).
This piece is well written and offers a plausible explanation within the framework of mainstream accepted knowledge. But it's explanations merely reflect what has emerged as conventional wisdom and the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of its author, namely strength in economic history understanding and relative weakness in mathematical fluency.
As a result the piece trashes mathematical skill and look to economic history in Keynesian analysis to seek prescriptions for the current predicament.
What Mr. Krugman may not be able to grasp is not that there are good maths and there are bad maths. The maths used in economic theory and neoclassical economic theory since the end of WWII is transposed from Physics and seems a priori impressive. But we seek to address economic issues. "It ain't Physics" . It is only suitable and built for a world with no constraints on resources, continuity of time and space, unrestricted trade i.e. no frictions, perfect rationality of operators, etc.
There have been recent attempts to correct those assumptions, but all withing the edifice of the traditional mathematical architecture.
Indeed behavioral economics and finance are descriptive theories and provide a well deserved criticism of rational agents theories, but these have not been translated in efficient prescriptive formulations.
BICs are built from the ground up to provide a more resilient framework for more effective formulations that reflect actual human economic reality and behavior. They provide the math to efficiently accommodate evolving economic realities
My biggest concern is with prescriptions that are derived from Mr. Krugman's analysis. They are backward looking and fail to integrate the economic transformations that have taken place since the 1930s, notably the advent of the Internet, the rise of the service and network economies, the relative decline of manufacturing as a source of economic wealth, globalization, the environment...
-------------
PS: The following section made me scratch my head:"The theoretical model that finance economists developed by assuming that every investor rationally balances risk against reward — the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM (pronounced cap-em) — is wonderfully elegant. And if you accept its premises it’s also extremely useful. CAPM not only tells you how to choose your portfolio — even more important from the financial industry’s point of view, it tells you how to put a price on financial derivatives, claims on claims."
Although the original vanilla call option was originally priced by Fischer Black using a CAPM based argument, derivatives pricing theory in all subsequent textbooks more the arbitrage arguments along Merton's Rational Pricing Theory. It is true that Merton makes a CAPM style argument to value derivatives in incomplete settings such as underlyings driven by jumps, but a robust and replicative pricing argument can still be made without reference to the CAPM and its outrageous assumptions, as I do with BICss.
OK, here let's just say the proposition on CAPM as the modern tool used to value derivatives is debatable. As far as I know, the CAPM is more commonly used in corporate finance for corporate valuation purposes where one uses the CAPM to obtain the required rate of return that is used to discount expected future earnings to deduce present value.
But what's really is a bit startling to me is the characterization of derivatives as "claims on claims"... Derivatives are contracts whose payout is is derived from(i.e. is a function of )the value of other observables(stocks, credit indices, temperature,...) at payout payment time(i.e. maturity).
Friday, April 17, 2009
Op-Ed Columnist - Green Shoots and Glimmers - NYTimes.com
Op-Ed Columnist - Green Shoots and Glimmers - NYTimes.com: "the White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, says that “you will see in a systematic and coordinated way the transparency of determining and showing to all involved some of the results of these stress tests.” No, I don’t know what that means, either."
In my college days in France, we used to call this "Grand Pipeau"!
In my college days in France, we used to call this "Grand Pipeau"!
Monday, March 30, 2009
Geithner Plan: The False Dichotomy of Alternate Choices
Based on Meet the Press and This week interviews of Mr. Geithner, nobody at the the treasury seems to have seriously raised to the Secretary's attention, the possibility of a less costly, surgical, and more effective alternative through market making as I have advocated.
The False Dichotomy of Alternate Choices. False dilemma.
I cry a river over this.
The False Dichotomy of Alternate Choices. False dilemma.
I cry a river over this.
Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy
Sunday, March 29, 2009
Estimating Asset Costs for TARP/PPIF in a Market Making Framework & BICs - a knol by Phil Kongtcheu
Estimating Asset Costs for TARP in a Market Making Framework & BICs - a knol by Phil Kongtcheu
This article is a follow-up to the knol article "Fair Value Pricing, Government Market Making and TARP" and uses the concept introduced in the knol article " Introduction to Basis Instruments Contracts (BICs) for Mathematics, Finance, and Economics".
In this article we seek to estimate the proportion of assets ultimately held by the Government in a market making model, their cost and the parameters needed to make such estimates.
An important financial insight of this analysis is that we show that market making results in earning a spread that makes market making loss unlikely.
This article is a follow-up to the knol article "Fair Value Pricing, Government Market Making and TARP" and uses the concept introduced in the knol article " Introduction to Basis Instruments Contracts (BICs) for Mathematics, Finance, and Economics".
In this article we seek to estimate the proportion of assets ultimately held by the Government in a market making model, their cost and the parameters needed to make such estimates.
An important financial insight of this analysis is that we show that market making results in earning a spread that makes market making loss unlikely.
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Senators Debate Fed's Role in Overseeing Systemic Risk - WSJ.com
Senators Debate Fed's Role in Overseeing Systemic Risk - WSJ.com
Reasonable debate to have. In my book BICs 4 Derivatives Volume I : Theory
(Chapter VIII, pp 192-195), I argued for a central counterparty organization as counterparty of reference on all trades which guarantees the payment of contractual agreements on both sides of a transaction.
The systemic risk overseeing entity should act as central counterparty of reference on all trades whose default may pose a systemic risk or act as a regulator and guarantor of last resort to private entities (exchanges, clearing houses,...) who play such a role.
As a guarantor of last resort, this entity may be best within FDIC; As guarantor of credibility through the power to print money, this entity may be best within the Central Bank authority. What is most important in my view is that its function be articulated as proposed above.
Reasonable debate to have. In my book BICs 4 Derivatives Volume I : Theory
(Chapter VIII, pp 192-195), I argued for a central counterparty organization as counterparty of reference on all trades which guarantees the payment of contractual agreements on both sides of a transaction.
The systemic risk overseeing entity should act as central counterparty of reference on all trades whose default may pose a systemic risk or act as a regulator and guarantor of last resort to private entities (exchanges, clearing houses,...) who play such a role.
As a guarantor of last resort, this entity may be best within FDIC; As guarantor of credibility through the power to print money, this entity may be best within the Central Bank authority. What is most important in my view is that its function be articulated as proposed above.
Friday, March 13, 2009
John Stewart Vs. Jim Cramer
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart | Stewart vs. Cramer:
A few thoughts:
1) "Is collective responsibility an alibi?"
This topic of my high school philosophy dissertation exam seems to me like something that out to be debated or revisited here. All the culprits in the present crisis seem to think collective responsibility is an alibi. I differ.
How at the very least about a journalistic or governmental effort to search and single out the heroes?
2) "It is much easier for a man to fail conventionally than to stand against the crowd and speak the truth" John Maynard Keynes
The usual expectation is that the one(s) who stood against the crowd and spoke the truth at great cost to themselves would reap the benefits when convention fails.
Painful as it was to watch for Mr. Cramer, I suspect he is still going to be having his show and make even more money "head he wins, tail you loose".
I have spent a decade on BICs, and BICs would have helped and can still help get out of this... And here am I, just as pitiful, out of the public sight and out of the public mind.
Where is the morality of all of this?
3) Is it time to debunk the Financial Investment Equity Risk Premium Fallacy
which says over the long term stocks outperform bonds?
(1976 Ibbotson Brinson) .See also:
http://www.dailyspeculations.com/scholarly/LongTermStockReturns.html
http://corporate.morningstar.com/ib/documents/MethodologyDocuments/IBBAssociates/IntnlRiskPremium.pdf
How about saying "Lies, damned lies, and statistics"
I bet that buying government I-Bond (inflation bonds) would yield a better return net of management fees and taxes than the large majority of index funds.
But saying that would destroy the entire financial advisory industry. So let's keep it quiet....
4) Finance and Economics is a complex and serious business that must be handled with nuance, intellectual sophistication that can sound very boring to simply minded persons; by attempting to be simplistic and entertaining to attract huge audiences, CNBC & Cramer dig for themselves huge holes in which they ultimately fall
The Stewart clip evidence against Cramer:
CARLY SIMON - YOU'RE SO VAIN referred to by stewart in the interview
A few thoughts:
1) "Is collective responsibility an alibi?"
This topic of my high school philosophy dissertation exam seems to me like something that out to be debated or revisited here. All the culprits in the present crisis seem to think collective responsibility is an alibi. I differ.
How at the very least about a journalistic or governmental effort to search and single out the heroes?
2) "It is much easier for a man to fail conventionally than to stand against the crowd and speak the truth" John Maynard Keynes
The usual expectation is that the one(s) who stood against the crowd and spoke the truth at great cost to themselves would reap the benefits when convention fails.
Painful as it was to watch for Mr. Cramer, I suspect he is still going to be having his show and make even more money "head he wins, tail you loose".
I have spent a decade on BICs, and BICs would have helped and can still help get out of this... And here am I, just as pitiful, out of the public sight and out of the public mind.
Where is the morality of all of this?
3) Is it time to debunk the Financial Investment Equity Risk Premium Fallacy
which says over the long term stocks outperform bonds?
(1976 Ibbotson Brinson) .See also:
http://www.dailyspeculations.com/scholarly/LongTermStockReturns.html
http://corporate.morningstar.com/ib/documents/MethodologyDocuments/IBBAssociates/IntnlRiskPremium.pdf
How about saying "Lies, damned lies, and statistics"
I bet that buying government I-Bond (inflation bonds) would yield a better return net of management fees and taxes than the large majority of index funds.
But saying that would destroy the entire financial advisory industry. So let's keep it quiet....
4) Finance and Economics is a complex and serious business that must be handled with nuance, intellectual sophistication that can sound very boring to simply minded persons; by attempting to be simplistic and entertaining to attract huge audiences, CNBC & Cramer dig for themselves huge holes in which they ultimately fall
The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c
The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c
The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c
The Stewart clip evidence against Cramer:
CARLY SIMON - YOU'RE SO VAIN referred to by stewart in the interview
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Charlie Rose - A conversation with Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Secretary
Charlie Rose - A conversation with Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Secretary
In this interview he made a lot of sense. His enunciation of principles is coherent; however the actual tools to effect those principles, while not entirely unacceptable are not always the most effective I would think of.
"Ars sine scientia nihil est"
For example, when he is talking about doing the private public partnership to unclog tarp assets . They are going to lend money to private investors so that the can go and buy tarp assets. The contention I have repeatedly made is: why would this be better than setting up a market making operation on those assets traded at a refined level of granularity?
In this interview he made a lot of sense. His enunciation of principles is coherent; however the actual tools to effect those principles, while not entirely unacceptable are not always the most effective I would think of.
"Ars sine scientia nihil est"
For example, when he is talking about doing the private public partnership to unclog tarp assets . They are going to lend money to private investors so that the can go and buy tarp assets. The contention I have repeatedly made is: why would this be better than setting up a market making operation on those assets traded at a refined level of granularity?
Monday, March 9, 2009
LinkedIn: Answers: What are the best ways to enable grassroots stimulus, esp. with entrepreneurship?
LinkedIn: Answers: What are the best ways to enable grassroots stimulus, esp. with entrepreneurship?: "How about simply providing stimulative loans/ investments directly to all those educated professional in the financial services and media sectors that are being laid off in droves to start up anew?
Simple criteria: US Citizen or Permanent resident+college degree
Max amount 50K - No paperwork -Checks mailed by the IRS"
Simple criteria: US Citizen or Permanent resident+college degree
Max amount 50K - No paperwork -Checks mailed by the IRS"
Sunday, March 8, 2009
Saturday Night Live - Geithner Cold Open - Video - NBC.com
Dear Mr. Secretary Geithner,
Please , read this:
Please, please, please
Please , read this:
How to Value Illiquid Toxic Assets clogging up the banking system
Please, please, please
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