Showing posts with label Toxic Assets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Toxic Assets. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
Corzine - BICs - Impressions - What is acceptable - Rent Seeking
Everybody seems to be sporting about the latest travails of Mr. Corzine, but many if not most (or virtually all) of those who seem to be moralizing now surf or have surfed the same rent seeking privileges that have little to do with actual competence. Every now and then, the bubble pops, a few unlucky bad ones pay for all the systemic sins, but the system itself perdures, with incremental adjustment here and there.
True change, whether in politics, social values or rules for economic entitlement come only after a forceful clash in which absurd existing rules or laws may be trampled in the process for a fairer order to emerge.
The present crisis continues its slow bleed because that necessary purifying process did not occur. Even after the comparatively milder dot-com bubble popped, the clean up was more extensive and more were held accountable.
Despite all the gospel to the contrary, it can be uncommonly difficult for the uncompromising innovator that the system proclaims to value above all to be heard. This seems truer if such innovations precisely pertain to the core issues that have put the system to its knees.
We persist in looking for solutions where we are least likely to find them even though the historic record is unambiguous that lasting solutions to systemic problems more often than not come from outsiders. Up to now the system has failed to look/consider or even acknowledge solutions proposed by outsiders. One of the problems exarcerbating our socio-economic issues is that the existing power structure is poisoned by a system of "normative meritocracy" blinded by a codified system of merit that tend to undervalues when it does not simply obliterate all other forms of emerging and more relevant competencies.
Democracy in politics, branded academic credentials, peer review and other idealistically sounding principles collude to create dystopian realities for true innovators whose ideas and works can actually benefit the greater good.
BICs in the many ignored ideas and works it leads and spread throughout this blog can only be seen as an ultimate example of a flawed system of incentives and punishments. See also: US Patent No. 7,933,824 .
References:
US Patent No. 7,933,824.
NYT Editorial Nov 2, 2011: Mr. Corzine's Big Bet
NY Times- Nocera: Corzine Crashes like It's 2008
WSJ: Corzine Agonistes
Others Pay Price for Corzine’s Risky Revenge: William D. Cohan
Douthat: Our reckless meritocracy
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet. Really ?
See: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703871904575216251915383146.html
Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet. Really? but not for the reason this guy gives...and he is a professor at some big Ivy league School!
I read this article with a certain sense of bemusement at the level of ignorance the author therein demonstrated. He seems to have no understanding of issues of 2-timing, N-timing in bilateral netting agreements. The issues he worries about would be addresses in centralized or interconnected hierarchical clearing system as explained in my knol and powerpoint/ youtube presentation
References:
The Holistic Theorem
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703871904575216251915383146.html
Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet. Really? but not for the reason this guy gives...and he is a professor at some big Ivy league School!
I read this article with a certain sense of bemusement at the level of ignorance the author therein demonstrated. He seems to have no understanding of issues of 2-timing, N-timing in bilateral netting agreements. The issues he worries about would be addresses in centralized or interconnected hierarchical clearing system as explained in my knol and powerpoint/ youtube presentation
References:
The Holistic Theorem
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703871904575216251915383146.html
Monday, October 5, 2009
Public-Private Investment Program Almost Ready to Begin - NYTimes.com
Public-Private Investment Program Almost Ready to Begin - NYTimes.com
This article has some important numbers to bear in mind:
"The International Monetary Fund estimated last week that financial institutions worldwide still held about $2.8 trillion in troubled mortgages and securities, and that they had booked losses on less than half that amount so far. A big share of those assets is in American banks.
The Public-Private Investment Program would acquire only a tiny fraction of those assets, amounting to $12 billion. All told, the Treasury said, the five firms have thus far raised $3.07 billion in private equity. The Treasury will match that amount, dollar for dollar, with its own equity investment. It will also provide up to $6.13 billion in financing guaranteed by the government.
In effect, the money-management firms will be able to buy about $12 billion in troubled assets. The firms will split any profits evenly with the Treasury, but taxpayers would ultimately be on the hook if the investments lost money."
Finally it looks like it is going to start at long last along the lines that we outlined in The Investment Professional
http://www.theinvestmentprofessional.com/vol_2_no_3/abstract-bics.html
See also my knol articles:
1. Fair Value Pricing, Government Market Making and PPIP
2. Estimating Costs for PPIP Assets in a Market Making Framework & BICs
This article has some important numbers to bear in mind:
"The International Monetary Fund estimated last week that financial institutions worldwide still held about $2.8 trillion in troubled mortgages and securities, and that they had booked losses on less than half that amount so far. A big share of those assets is in American banks.
The Public-Private Investment Program would acquire only a tiny fraction of those assets, amounting to $12 billion. All told, the Treasury said, the five firms have thus far raised $3.07 billion in private equity. The Treasury will match that amount, dollar for dollar, with its own equity investment. It will also provide up to $6.13 billion in financing guaranteed by the government.
In effect, the money-management firms will be able to buy about $12 billion in troubled assets. The firms will split any profits evenly with the Treasury, but taxpayers would ultimately be on the hook if the investments lost money."
Finally it looks like it is going to start at long last along the lines that we outlined in The Investment Professional
http://www.theinvestmentprofessional.com/vol_2_no_3/abstract-bics.html
See also my knol articles:
1. Fair Value Pricing, Government Market Making and PPIP
2. Estimating Costs for PPIP Assets in a Market Making Framework & BICs
Monday, March 30, 2009
Geithner Plan: The False Dichotomy of Alternate Choices
Based on Meet the Press and This week interviews of Mr. Geithner, nobody at the the treasury seems to have seriously raised to the Secretary's attention, the possibility of a less costly, surgical, and more effective alternative through market making as I have advocated.
The False Dichotomy of Alternate Choices. False dilemma.
I cry a river over this.
The False Dichotomy of Alternate Choices. False dilemma.
I cry a river over this.
Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy
Sunday, March 29, 2009
Estimating Asset Costs for TARP/PPIF in a Market Making Framework & BICs - a knol by Phil Kongtcheu
Estimating Asset Costs for TARP in a Market Making Framework & BICs - a knol by Phil Kongtcheu
This article is a follow-up to the knol article "Fair Value Pricing, Government Market Making and TARP" and uses the concept introduced in the knol article " Introduction to Basis Instruments Contracts (BICs) for Mathematics, Finance, and Economics".
In this article we seek to estimate the proportion of assets ultimately held by the Government in a market making model, their cost and the parameters needed to make such estimates.
An important financial insight of this analysis is that we show that market making results in earning a spread that makes market making loss unlikely.
This article is a follow-up to the knol article "Fair Value Pricing, Government Market Making and TARP" and uses the concept introduced in the knol article " Introduction to Basis Instruments Contracts (BICs) for Mathematics, Finance, and Economics".
In this article we seek to estimate the proportion of assets ultimately held by the Government in a market making model, their cost and the parameters needed to make such estimates.
An important financial insight of this analysis is that we show that market making results in earning a spread that makes market making loss unlikely.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Geithner plan arithmetic - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com
Geithner plan arithmetic - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com
I agree with the subsidy argument made here to reject the Geithner plan but the example while at first very neat, nonetheless misses an element of investors preferences: many investors have already lost a lot and it is not unreasonable for them to demand more to risk what they've got left. Here is how it works:
Let's suppose Dr. Krugman's net worth is $100 million (including job security and reputation) and I say we flip a coin with equal probability of head and tail.
If it falls on head, Dr. Krugman wins and receives $1 billion; If it falls on tail, he loses everything he has got and pays out his net worth of $100 million. Will he take the bait?
I do not know the structure of Dr. Krugman's risk preferences but I am sure most people will not take it, even though their expected gain here would be $450 million.
This is what I call the fallacy of expectations based risk management. Many of the firms that go under in every financial crisis make the same mistake, often advised by very, very smart people. They make their investment decisions based on expectations profiles without full appraisal of the sustainability of downside scenarios that higher order metrics such as variance/volatility or above fail to capture. It seems a lot of very, very smart people out there are still making the same kind of intellectually cute but intrinsically flawed argument.
For this reason, I think the more simplistic example of my earlier post makes a more robust argument explaining the subsidy part of the plan.
I agree with the subsidy argument made here to reject the Geithner plan but the example while at first very neat, nonetheless misses an element of investors preferences: many investors have already lost a lot and it is not unreasonable for them to demand more to risk what they've got left. Here is how it works:
Let's suppose Dr. Krugman's net worth is $100 million (including job security and reputation) and I say we flip a coin with equal probability of head and tail.
If it falls on head, Dr. Krugman wins and receives $1 billion; If it falls on tail, he loses everything he has got and pays out his net worth of $100 million. Will he take the bait?
I do not know the structure of Dr. Krugman's risk preferences but I am sure most people will not take it, even though their expected gain here would be $450 million.
This is what I call the fallacy of expectations based risk management. Many of the firms that go under in every financial crisis make the same mistake, often advised by very, very smart people. They make their investment decisions based on expectations profiles without full appraisal of the sustainability of downside scenarios that higher order metrics such as variance/volatility or above fail to capture. It seems a lot of very, very smart people out there are still making the same kind of intellectually cute but intrinsically flawed argument.
For this reason, I think the more simplistic example of my earlier post makes a more robust argument explaining the subsidy part of the plan.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Geithner: My Plan for Bad Bank Assets - WSJ.com
Geithner: My Plan for Bad Bank Assets - WSJ.com
From what I understand from this piece, this plan deals with the capital structure of the funds that will purchase the assets, but not the mechanism through which the asset prices will be formed, i.e how the funds will price the assets...Umh...OK.
It seemed to me that the pb is not that there is no money out there, but that money does not want to touch those toxic assets and that the role govt in this is to come up with an efficient pricing mechanism that restores liquidity.
A few hours later,...
Well, in fact this plan is still a big unjustified subsidy to Wall Street compared to what I have proposed. To make it easy, consider this
Suppose you want to buy to buy a toxic asset T. You think that when you dispose of it in a year it will be worth $110. How much will you be willing to pay for it today? It all depends on the cost of borrowing. If you can get a 0% loan you can pay up to $110. If the interest rate is 10%, you will not pay more than $100 for T. So the lender who lends you money at 0% when the market on such loans is 10% is giving you a subsidy that you will share with the asset T seller. Furthermore lending such subsidized money to more than one potential buyer will ensure through competitive forces that the bulk of the subsidy is passed on to the seller. That's probably why Wall Street cheered today..
From what I understand from this piece, this plan deals with the capital structure of the funds that will purchase the assets, but not the mechanism through which the asset prices will be formed, i.e how the funds will price the assets...Umh...OK.
It seemed to me that the pb is not that there is no money out there, but that money does not want to touch those toxic assets and that the role govt in this is to come up with an efficient pricing mechanism that restores liquidity.
A few hours later,...
Well, in fact this plan is still a big unjustified subsidy to Wall Street compared to what I have proposed. To make it easy, consider this
Suppose you want to buy to buy a toxic asset T. You think that when you dispose of it in a year it will be worth $110. How much will you be willing to pay for it today? It all depends on the cost of borrowing. If you can get a 0% loan you can pay up to $110. If the interest rate is 10%, you will not pay more than $100 for T. So the lender who lends you money at 0% when the market on such loans is 10% is giving you a subsidy that you will share with the asset T seller. Furthermore lending such subsidized money to more than one potential buyer will ensure through competitive forces that the bulk of the subsidy is passed on to the seller. That's probably why Wall Street cheered today..
Op-Ed Columnist - Financial Policy Despair - NYTimes.com
Op-Ed Columnist - Financial Policy Despair - NYTimes.com
I could not agree more with Mr. Krugman on the sense of desperation over this plan.
I have cried a river over this, and over and over.
And I cry again...
However we arrive at the same conclusion from different analytic paths and our prescriptions differ. My analysis remains this
I could not agree more with Mr. Krugman on the sense of desperation over this plan.
I have cried a river over this, and over and over.
And I cry again...
However we arrive at the same conclusion from different analytic paths and our prescriptions differ. My analysis remains this
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Op-Ed Columnist - Are We Home Alone? - NYTimes.com
Op-Ed Columnist - Are We Home Alone? - NYTimes.com: "And you will ensure that we’ll never get out of this banking crisis, because the solution depends on getting private money funds to team up with the government to buy up toxic assets — and fund managers are growing terrified of any collaboration with government."
Huh!...
My only quarrel with the article is the apparent assumption that the plan the government appears to be poised to announce is the obviously best and only game in town...
Once more, Mr. Friedman, would you read this?
Huh!...
My only quarrel with the article is the apparent assumption that the plan the government appears to be poised to announce is the obviously best and only game in town...
Once more, Mr. Friedman, would you read this?
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Toxic Asset Plan Foresees Big Subsidies for Investors - NYTimes.com
Toxic Asset Plan Foresees Big Subsidies for Investors - NYTimes.com
Moronic disgrace.
Design complexity here is no substitute for discernment.
I cry a river over this.
See: http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/fair-value-pricing-government-market/
Moronic disgrace.
Design complexity here is no substitute for discernment.
I cry a river over this.
See: http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/fair-value-pricing-government-market/
Sunday, March 15, 2009
TALF Is Reworked After Investors Balk - WSJ.com
TALF Is Reworked After Investors Balk - WSJ.com
This subsidized lending program just looks like major league subsidy to the securities industry with layers of transaction costs that incentivize people to trade in potentially irrational way with cheap money and are likely to contribute to TARP assets price inflation . Why not just do market making as I have repeatedly suggested?
The key mistake here is that policy makers seem to confuse
- incentivizing trade on securities with high economic impact which should be the mission of the government here and would lead to a more rational underwriting industry practices going forward
vs
- encouraging the potential reckless issuance of new securities which may in fact perpetuate the practices that led to this mess.
This subsidized lending program just looks like major league subsidy to the securities industry with layers of transaction costs that incentivize people to trade in potentially irrational way with cheap money and are likely to contribute to TARP assets price inflation . Why not just do market making as I have repeatedly suggested?
The key mistake here is that policy makers seem to confuse
- incentivizing trade on securities with high economic impact which should be the mission of the government here and would lead to a more rational underwriting industry practices going forward
vs
- encouraging the potential reckless issuance of new securities which may in fact perpetuate the practices that led to this mess.
Sunday, March 8, 2009
Saturday Night Live - Geithner Cold Open - Video - NBC.com
Dear Mr. Secretary Geithner,
Please , read this:
Please, please, please
Please , read this:
How to Value Illiquid Toxic Assets clogging up the banking system
Please, please, please
Friday, March 6, 2009
Steve Forbes Says Barack Obama's Economic Policy Repeats George W. Bush's Mistakes - WSJ.com
Steve Forbes Says Barack Obama's Economic Policy Repeats George W. Bush's Mistakes - WSJ.com
I strongly disagree with this argument against mark to market. As for dealing with market illiquidity, as I explain in my article on how to price illiquid TARP assets, when trading of assets economically vital is disrupted, government should set in to play a market maker's role, one of the additional positive results of such an approach being to enable effective market to market.
It is unfortunate that many it is shaping as republican vs. democrat thing.
I strongly disagree with this argument against mark to market. As for dealing with market illiquidity, as I explain in my article on how to price illiquid TARP assets, when trading of assets economically vital is disrupted, government should set in to play a market maker's role, one of the additional positive results of such an approach being to enable effective market to market.
It is unfortunate that many it is shaping as republican vs. democrat thing.
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Fair Value Pricing, Government Market Making and TARP
I have just posted this on knol:
How to Value Illiquid Toxic Assets clogging up the banking system (Work in Progress)
This article argues that the administration would get a fairer deal in buying troubled assets by becoming a market maker on those assets bought at a most refined level of granularity using a proposed relatively straightforward market-making method. This approach further has the benefit of being minimally surgically invasive while most speedily addressing the problem.
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