This post is meant to refer to a knol Ihave written in response to a recent question posed on the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) community website : “Will public deficit reduction encourage private sector growth, or undermine a needed stimulus to recovery & lead to Japan-style stagnation?” This lead me, in view of my work on BICs, to wonder whether the deficit is really the right metric to focus on and analyze the extent to which it could be misleading.
I argue that the government balance sheet, rather than its cash flow position -from which the deficit is computed - should really be what eyes are focused on. The focus on balance would have and should better focus minds on stimulating high returns investments for sustainable recovery and expansion, some of which I discuss.
BICs enter in the picture because using their methodological prescription would make reliable and practical the complex and almost canutian task of computing the values of the different items on the government balance sheet.
I am gratified that the debate INET moderating team has picked on some of my suggestions and highlighted them in the debate summary(http://ineteconomics.org/blog/inet-community-responds-deficit-debate) as: "As far as new, creative solutions to the debate, a few users, such as kongtcheu, have urged governments to invest in entrepreneurship and clean energy projects, suggesting that these investments will create jobs and growth in the future."" I meant to say more than that.
References
Kongtcheu, Phil. The Deficit Debate - BICs:Is the deficit the right metric to focus on ? And what prescriptions does this leads to? [Internet]. Version 45. Basis Instruments Contracts (BICs). 2010 Aug 25. Available from: http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/the-deficit-debate-bics/24v2kgtuvzk2v/30.
http://ineteconomics.org/blog/inet-community-responds-deficit-debate
Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Monday, September 7, 2009
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? - NYTimes.com
How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? - NYTimes.com
This piece is well written and offers a plausible explanation within the framework of mainstream accepted knowledge. But it's explanations merely reflect what has emerged as conventional wisdom and the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of its author, namely strength in economic history understanding and relative weakness in mathematical fluency.
As a result the piece trashes mathematical skill and look to economic history in Keynesian analysis to seek prescriptions for the current predicament.
What Mr. Krugman may not be able to grasp is not that there are good maths and there are bad maths. The maths used in economic theory and neoclassical economic theory since the end of WWII is transposed from Physics and seems a priori impressive. But we seek to address economic issues. "It ain't Physics" . It is only suitable and built for a world with no constraints on resources, continuity of time and space, unrestricted trade i.e. no frictions, perfect rationality of operators, etc.
There have been recent attempts to correct those assumptions, but all withing the edifice of the traditional mathematical architecture.
Indeed behavioral economics and finance are descriptive theories and provide a well deserved criticism of rational agents theories, but these have not been translated in efficient prescriptive formulations.
BICs are built from the ground up to provide a more resilient framework for more effective formulations that reflect actual human economic reality and behavior. They provide the math to efficiently accommodate evolving economic realities
My biggest concern is with prescriptions that are derived from Mr. Krugman's analysis. They are backward looking and fail to integrate the economic transformations that have taken place since the 1930s, notably the advent of the Internet, the rise of the service and network economies, the relative decline of manufacturing as a source of economic wealth, globalization, the environment...
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PS: The following section made me scratch my head:"The theoretical model that finance economists developed by assuming that every investor rationally balances risk against reward — the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM (pronounced cap-em) — is wonderfully elegant. And if you accept its premises it’s also extremely useful. CAPM not only tells you how to choose your portfolio — even more important from the financial industry’s point of view, it tells you how to put a price on financial derivatives, claims on claims."
Although the original vanilla call option was originally priced by Fischer Black using a CAPM based argument, derivatives pricing theory in all subsequent textbooks more the arbitrage arguments along Merton's Rational Pricing Theory. It is true that Merton makes a CAPM style argument to value derivatives in incomplete settings such as underlyings driven by jumps, but a robust and replicative pricing argument can still be made without reference to the CAPM and its outrageous assumptions, as I do with BICss.
OK, here let's just say the proposition on CAPM as the modern tool used to value derivatives is debatable. As far as I know, the CAPM is more commonly used in corporate finance for corporate valuation purposes where one uses the CAPM to obtain the required rate of return that is used to discount expected future earnings to deduce present value.
But what's really is a bit startling to me is the characterization of derivatives as "claims on claims"... Derivatives are contracts whose payout is is derived from(i.e. is a function of )the value of other observables(stocks, credit indices, temperature,...) at payout payment time(i.e. maturity).
This piece is well written and offers a plausible explanation within the framework of mainstream accepted knowledge. But it's explanations merely reflect what has emerged as conventional wisdom and the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of its author, namely strength in economic history understanding and relative weakness in mathematical fluency.
As a result the piece trashes mathematical skill and look to economic history in Keynesian analysis to seek prescriptions for the current predicament.
What Mr. Krugman may not be able to grasp is not that there are good maths and there are bad maths. The maths used in economic theory and neoclassical economic theory since the end of WWII is transposed from Physics and seems a priori impressive. But we seek to address economic issues. "It ain't Physics" . It is only suitable and built for a world with no constraints on resources, continuity of time and space, unrestricted trade i.e. no frictions, perfect rationality of operators, etc.
There have been recent attempts to correct those assumptions, but all withing the edifice of the traditional mathematical architecture.
Indeed behavioral economics and finance are descriptive theories and provide a well deserved criticism of rational agents theories, but these have not been translated in efficient prescriptive formulations.
BICs are built from the ground up to provide a more resilient framework for more effective formulations that reflect actual human economic reality and behavior. They provide the math to efficiently accommodate evolving economic realities
My biggest concern is with prescriptions that are derived from Mr. Krugman's analysis. They are backward looking and fail to integrate the economic transformations that have taken place since the 1930s, notably the advent of the Internet, the rise of the service and network economies, the relative decline of manufacturing as a source of economic wealth, globalization, the environment...
-------------
PS: The following section made me scratch my head:"The theoretical model that finance economists developed by assuming that every investor rationally balances risk against reward — the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM (pronounced cap-em) — is wonderfully elegant. And if you accept its premises it’s also extremely useful. CAPM not only tells you how to choose your portfolio — even more important from the financial industry’s point of view, it tells you how to put a price on financial derivatives, claims on claims."
Although the original vanilla call option was originally priced by Fischer Black using a CAPM based argument, derivatives pricing theory in all subsequent textbooks more the arbitrage arguments along Merton's Rational Pricing Theory. It is true that Merton makes a CAPM style argument to value derivatives in incomplete settings such as underlyings driven by jumps, but a robust and replicative pricing argument can still be made without reference to the CAPM and its outrageous assumptions, as I do with BICss.
OK, here let's just say the proposition on CAPM as the modern tool used to value derivatives is debatable. As far as I know, the CAPM is more commonly used in corporate finance for corporate valuation purposes where one uses the CAPM to obtain the required rate of return that is used to discount expected future earnings to deduce present value.
But what's really is a bit startling to me is the characterization of derivatives as "claims on claims"... Derivatives are contracts whose payout is is derived from(i.e. is a function of )the value of other observables(stocks, credit indices, temperature,...) at payout payment time(i.e. maturity).
Sunday, March 15, 2009
TALF Is Reworked After Investors Balk - WSJ.com
TALF Is Reworked After Investors Balk - WSJ.com
This subsidized lending program just looks like major league subsidy to the securities industry with layers of transaction costs that incentivize people to trade in potentially irrational way with cheap money and are likely to contribute to TARP assets price inflation . Why not just do market making as I have repeatedly suggested?
The key mistake here is that policy makers seem to confuse
- incentivizing trade on securities with high economic impact which should be the mission of the government here and would lead to a more rational underwriting industry practices going forward
vs
- encouraging the potential reckless issuance of new securities which may in fact perpetuate the practices that led to this mess.
This subsidized lending program just looks like major league subsidy to the securities industry with layers of transaction costs that incentivize people to trade in potentially irrational way with cheap money and are likely to contribute to TARP assets price inflation . Why not just do market making as I have repeatedly suggested?
The key mistake here is that policy makers seem to confuse
- incentivizing trade on securities with high economic impact which should be the mission of the government here and would lead to a more rational underwriting industry practices going forward
vs
- encouraging the potential reckless issuance of new securities which may in fact perpetuate the practices that led to this mess.
Monday, March 9, 2009
Mathematical Model and the Mortgage Mess - NYTimes.com
Mathematical Model and the Mortgage Mess - NYTimes.com
Yes, BICs 4 Derivatives Volume I : Theory
chapter IX pp 203-232, showed that this was faulty and proposed the coherent alternative. When will you wake up people? when?
I cry a river over this. I cry a river over this....
As I have described at length in other writings(See this or this ), this crisis was a failure of the existing mathematical modeling framework at describing the real world dynamics of underlyings. Therefore the corresponding hedging and risk management strategies failed to represent reality and this fact becomes most obvious at times of crisis. One of the reasons for this development is the over-representation of former physicist at the highest levels of "quantdom" who have forced the adoption of a framework coming from another world. But "It ain't physics". It just ain't.
And I cry a river over this. I just cry a river over this....
Yes, BICs 4 Derivatives Volume I : Theory
chapter IX pp 203-232, showed that this was faulty and proposed the coherent alternative. When will you wake up people? when?I cry a river over this. I cry a river over this....
As I have described at length in other writings(See this or this ), this crisis was a failure of the existing mathematical modeling framework at describing the real world dynamics of underlyings. Therefore the corresponding hedging and risk management strategies failed to represent reality and this fact becomes most obvious at times of crisis. One of the reasons for this development is the over-representation of former physicist at the highest levels of "quantdom" who have forced the adoption of a framework coming from another world. But "It ain't physics". It just ain't.
And I cry a river over this. I just cry a river over this....
Friday, March 6, 2009
Steve Forbes Says Barack Obama's Economic Policy Repeats George W. Bush's Mistakes - WSJ.com
Steve Forbes Says Barack Obama's Economic Policy Repeats George W. Bush's Mistakes - WSJ.com
I strongly disagree with this argument against mark to market. As for dealing with market illiquidity, as I explain in my article on how to price illiquid TARP assets, when trading of assets economically vital is disrupted, government should set in to play a market maker's role, one of the additional positive results of such an approach being to enable effective market to market.
It is unfortunate that many it is shaping as republican vs. democrat thing.
I strongly disagree with this argument against mark to market. As for dealing with market illiquidity, as I explain in my article on how to price illiquid TARP assets, when trading of assets economically vital is disrupted, government should set in to play a market maker's role, one of the additional positive results of such an approach being to enable effective market to market.
It is unfortunate that many it is shaping as republican vs. democrat thing.
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Introduction to BICs
I am making my first post with an introduction to BICs that I have posted on my knol at:http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/introduction-to-basis-instruments/
More about me also at: http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/-/24v2kgtuvzk2v/0#
This article provides a definition for the concept of Basis Instrument Contracts (BICs) and explains why such a concept is needed and useful in Finance, Economics and Mathematics. It explains how BICs are practical and represent both a prophylactic and a therapeutic structural tool for a crisis such as the 2008 crisis. BICs help mitigate market volatility and facilitate more robust risk management.
More about me also at: http://knol.google.com/k/phil-kongtcheu/-/24v2kgtuvzk2v/0#
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